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RECENT CASES
AGENcY-LIABILITY OF UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACTS
OF AGENT-Defendant, with other defendants, executed two promissory
notes, secured by a deed of trust 'to certain property owned by the defend-
ants, to the agent of the plaintiff. The application for the loan was
made to the agent. The property subsequently -twice changed hands, each
new grantee assuming and agreeing to pay the incumbrance, and paying
interest to the agent. The last real owner made a settlement with the
agent, turning over to him the deed, a lease on part of the rented prop-
erty and some cash. Defendant contended that by the acts of the agent
in accepting the settlement, there was a merger of title and indebtedness
in the principal, and he is released from liability on the notes. Held:
That it was a question for the jury, whether or not the principal, by his
silence, impliedly authorized the acts of the agent. Goleblatt v. Cannon,
37 Pac. (2d) 525 (Okla. 1934).
The foregoing decision raises the question as to just how far the
courts will go in holding an undisclosed principal liable for the un-
authorized acts of his agent. It is obvious that the theory of apparent
authority will not apply, since apparent authority is the power which
results from acts which appear to the third person -to be authorized by
the principal, and if such third person does not know of the existence of
a principal there can be no apparent authority.
A general agent, for an undisclosed principal authorized, to conduct
transactions, subjects his principal to liability for acts done on his ac-
count, if usual or necessary in such transactions, although forbidden by
the principal to do them. Restatement of Agency, section 194. The
question then arises, was the agent a general agent, and if he was, were
the acts usual or necessary in such transactions? In the instant case,
it is apparent that the agent was not a general agent, nor were the acts
usual or necessary in such transaction.
If the act of the agent has in fact been unaufhorized, and not
even within the usual power of agents of that type, the liability of the
principal must depend upon some theory whereby the principal
ratifies the acts of the agent, or in some way aots in such a
manner as to be estopped from asserting that the agent was not, in
fact, authorized to do the acts which he did. Usually a condition prece-
dent to the ability of the principal to ratify, is that the agent purported
to act as an agent This is, of course, impossible where the principal is
undisclosed. The weight of authority excludes a ratification by an undis-
closed principal. Keighley v. Durant, (1901) A. C. 240; Schessznger 'V.
Forest Prod. Co., (1910) 78 N. J. Law 637, 76 AUt. 1024, Brown Realty Co.
v. Myers, (1916) 89 N. J. Law 247, 98 Atl. 310; Ankeny 'v. Young Bros.,
(1909) 52 Wash. 235, 100 Pac. 736. The theory upon which an agent can
act for an undisclosed principal so as to bind him to a third person, is
itself an anomaly of the law, and to allow ratification in such cases
would be to heap one anomaly of the law of agency upon another.
Despite this fact Massachusetts distinguishes the cases in which the
agent sntended to act on behalf of the undisclosed principal and permits
ratification. Hayward 'v. Langmazd, (1902) 181 Mass. 426, 63 N. E. 912;
Hixon. v. Starr (1922) 242 Mass. 371, 136 N. E. 186.
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In Washington, the modern trend, -has been to hold the undisclosed
principal liable, where the acts of the agent have been unauthorized. It
is admitted that some of the earlier cases are contra, but the more recent
decisions have revealed that the principal will be held wherever the
court can find any reasonable ground upon which to base their decision.
In the early case of Murphy v. Clarkson, (1901) 25 Wash. 585, 66 Pac.
51 the court held that the principal could not be held liable, where he
gave his agent the power to convey land, and the evidence showed that
the contract was executed in the name of the agent, as if the latter
were the owner- that the contract nowise disclosed the relation of prin-
cipal and agent; that nothing was shown that the plaintiff believed he
was dealing with an agent. The basis of the decision was that the court
thought that it was an impossibility for an agent, by unauthorized acts,
to bind his undisclosed principal. But see, Kraus v. Dowell (1922) 119
Wash. 90, 204 Pac. 795 (where it was held that a loan agent is shown
to be the agent of the assignee of a mortgage, with authority to col-
lect principal as well as interest of a mortgage in which it was the
mortgagee, although it did not have possession of the mortgage note,
where its practice was to make loans in. its own name, indorse them to
its customers, collect and remit interest and the assignee was familiar
with this practice, took a note without recording any assignment and
had no dealings with the mortgagor, until after the agent had collected
part of the principal and become insolvent.) First Nat'l Bank of Seattle
v. Hessell (1925) 133 Wash. 643, 234 Pac. 662 (where a bank assigned a
promissory note to another bank, the court held that the assignor had
authority to collect the note, where the note was payable to the assignor,
and it was the custom for this bank to collect such notes, even though
the note was not in its possession.) Pfezffer v. Heyes (1932) 166
Wash. 125, 6 Pac. (2d) 612, (an action by the mortgagor to cancel three
notes and a mortgage delivered to Osner & Mehlhorn, as payee and mort-
gagee. The latter sold the notes and assigned the mortgage to Heyes,
but the assignment was never recorded. The mortgagor was never ad-
vised of the assignment, and continued to make payments of principal
and interest, when due, to Osner and Mehlhorn, assuming and believing
that the latter was still the owner of the notes and mortgage.)
It is submitted, that the theory upon which the actual principal should
be held liable should be based upon the fact that by permitting the agent
to hold himself out as the principal, with full power to contract, and
thereby innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such
apparent principal, they will be protected. Their rights under such cir-
cumstances should not depend upon the actual authority of the party
with whom they are directly dealing, but are derived from the act of
the real principal which precludes him from disputing, as against them,
the existence of the authority, which through negligence or mistaken
confidence he has allowed to vest in the party with whom they are deal-
ing, especially where such third party has substantially changed his
position in reliance thereon.
E. G. N.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DELEGATION or LEGisLATIVE POWER TO A FoREIGN
BODY. Lasswell was convicted of violating various sections of the code
of fair competition of the cleaning and dyeing trade including charging
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less than the minimum price of cleaning fixed by the code. This code
was made law in California by a state statute (art 8775, sec. 2, 1933 Laws
California) decreeing that the federal N.R.A. codes should become state
law as soon as formulated by the federal government. Relying on Ithe Home
Buileing & Loan Assoczation. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), which
upheld a state statute under the "emergency" doctrine, and Nebbta V.
NVew York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934), which upheld a state statute fixing
prices in a "paramount industry," the court in the Lasswell case decided
that price-fixing by the state in the cleaning and dyeing industry did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The
court next dealt with the problem of delegation of legislative power
and ruled (1) that a "primary standard" had been fixed -by the state
statute and (2) that delegating the legislative power of "filling in
details" to a foreign body did not violate the state Constitution. Ex Parte
Lasswell, 36 Pac. (2nd) 678, (Cal. App., Sept., 1934).
John Marshall stated in one of his decisions, Waymanv . Southard, 10
Wheaton 42 (1825), that because the Constitution separated distinctly the
three departments of government, there could be no delegation from one
department to the other. But because the affairs of governmnt became so
expanded and intricate towards the latter part of the 19th century, the
United States Supreme Court declared that Congress, after setting forth
a "primary standard," could delegate Ithe task of "filling in details" to
executive agencies. Union Brdge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364 (1906) U. S. V.
Grtmaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910) Hampton Jr & Co. v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394
(1927). Soon the state courts adopted the same principles. 12 C. J. 840.
In the LassweUl case the state legislature delegated the "filling in
details" to the federal Congress, a body foreign to the state legislature.
Likewise, the California legislature impliedly delegated to the President
of the United States, a foreign official, authority to bind California with
his decrees since the federal N.P.A. codes gave him that power and
California adopted those codes in toto. The Lasswell case cited as
authority for the constitutionality of such -delegation Ex Parte Gerno,
143 Cal. 412, 77 Pac. 166 (1904) where a state statute required a certificate
from some medical school whose requirements were no less than those
prescribed by the Association of American Medical Colleges (a foreign
body) as a prerequisite to practice medicine. The Gemno case merely
adopts the foreign body's list of schools as expert opinion of a first-class
medical school that meets the Association's requirements; whereas the
Lasswell case permits the foreign body to legislate what actions shall con-
stitute a crime in the state. It is submitted that Ex Parte Germno is too
narrow to support the Lasswell case.
The following cases have held that delegation of the legislative power
of "filling in details" to a foreign body is unconstitutional. The case of
State v. Webber, 125 Me. 319, 133 AtI. 738 (1926), held that incorporation
in statutes, by reference, of future pharmacopoeial revisions or enact-
ments of Congress was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
State v. Intoxmcating Liquor, 121 Me. 438, 117 AI. 588 (1922), decided that
adoption by state statute of future definitions of intoxicating liquor by
Congress was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In Re
Op'ton of the Justices, 239 Mass. 603, 133 N. E. 453 (1921), held that a
state statute which, to give effect to the Eighteenth Amendment in Massa-
chusetts, created criminal offenses, not by definition, but by reference to
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present and future Congressional laws in these particulars, was an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power. The only reason the court
gave for their decision in these three cases was that to hold the statute
constitutional would destroy the fundamental conceptions of our gov-
ernment.
As a consequence of the National Industrial Recovery Act, many of
our states have adopted statutes similar to the one in the Lasswell case
calling for wholesale incorporation of federal codes as state law as soon
as formulated by the federal government. In the last two years this
constitutional problem of the delegation of "filling in details" to a foreign
body has been adjudicated by many state and several lower federal courts,
but their decisions reveal a conflict of authority. In People v. Capitol
Cleaners & Dyers, Superior Court, Los Angeles County February, 1934,
Leading Decisions VII B, V E 43, the court held the California Recovery
A,3t invalid insofar as it purported to adopt as state laws those N.R.A.
codes which were adopted after the passage of the state act, or which
will be adopted in the future. But the Superior Court, Santa Clara, Cali-
fornia, held the contrary in People v. Economy Cleaners, Loading Deci-
sions VII B, V E 43. A state statute adopting federal codes with power
in -he President was held a constitutional delegation of legislative power
to the President in State v. Dusha, Ohio No. 140434, October, 1934, Lead-
ing Decisions VII B, V E 44c. In Cline v. Consumers' Cooperative, 152
Misc. 653, 274 N. Y. S. 362 (Sept., 1934), the opposite conclusion from
the Lasswell case was reached with a substantially similar statute. With-
out citing any case authority, the New York court held the state statute
incorporating by reference present and future N.R.A. codes unconstitu-
tional and stated, "There is no power in the Legislature of the State of New
York to delegate any of its legislative powers to any outside agency as
to the Federal Government or to the President of the United States. To
do so is to impair the sovereignty of the state itself." The case of Dar-
weger v. Staats, 275 N. Y. S. 394 (Nov., 1934), involved the same statute
as Cline v. Consumers' Cooperative and reached the same result-that the
statute was unconstitutional. The court said, "The Legislature cannot
delegate the sovereign powers of the state to an administrative or execu-
tive authority of a foreign jurisdiction. It cannot surrender the sov-
ereignty of the state to declare the acts constituting a crime to federal
executive or administrative authority." The only reasons the court
gave were that the Constitution of New York set up legislative powers in
two distinct houses, and prohibited incorporation of laws in statutes by
reference, which two provisions the statute violated, and, in addition,
the statute was contrary to every principle upon which our republican
institutions are based. Darweger v. Staats cited Cline v. Consumers' Co-
operative with approval.
The recent case of Spselman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 8 F Supp. 437
(October, 1934) decided in a federal district court of New York, held
that the New York N.R.A. statute was constitutional, which same statute
was decreed unconstitutional by two state courts in Cline v. Consumers'
Cooperative and Darweger v. Staats. The Spielman case avoided -the con-
stitutional difficulty of delegation of legislative power by declaring, "The
.ode is but an administrative product of the executive's application of
N.I.A.-it is not a law" Spseln un v. Dodge is now pending appeal to
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the United States Supreme Court (55 Sup. Ct. 237) and the Supreme
Court may possibly decide whether or not this delegation of legislative
power to a foreign body is a violation of the Constitution of the State
of New York. Should the Supreme Court see fit to decide this state con-
stitutional problem, they probably would follow the state court's con-
struction of the New York statute as given in Cline v. Consurers' Co-
operative and Darweger v. Staats because the federal courts follow the
state courts in the construction of state statutes. Green v. Frazzer 253
U. S. 233 (1920) 25 C. J. 832; Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 287 U. S.
346 (1932). Should the Supreme Court reverse the Spzelman decision on
this ground, its decision would, no doubt, carry weight with state
courts far-ed with similar problems. C. C.
EVIDENC--PAROL EVIDENCE RULE-COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS. P was em-
ployed by D as an automobile salesman, the employment being terminable
at the will of either party. In March, 1932, D informed all of the sales-
men, including P that in order to hold their jobs, they must purchase
new cars from D, under conditional sales contracts providing for a down
payment and six monthly installments, balance to be paid at the end of
that period. D agreed to take in P's old car at a sufficient price to cover
the down payment and the six installments. P did not wish to purchase a
new car, but D promised to save him harmless from any money loss on
the deal by -taking the car back at the end of six months and selling it for
enough so that after deducting the balance of the purchase price, P would
have left an amount equal to the value of the car which he traded in. It
was never intended that P should make any payments beyond trading in
his old car. On the faith of this oral agreement and in order to hold his
job, P signed a conditional sales contract which contained a provision to
the effect that no warranties, representations or agreements had been
made by the seller unless specifically set forth therein. At this time, D
was in bad financial condition and the clear purpose of forcing sales to
the salesmen was to enable D to raise money by selling the conditional
sales contracts so obtained to a finance company. In P's case, this was
done shortly after he signed the contract. A few days prior to -the expira-
tion of the six months period, P was discharged. When the balance be-
came due on the conditional sales contract, P was unable to pay it, and
the finance company repossessed -the car. P sued to recover on the oral
promise to save him harmless, and D set up the parol evidence rule.
The trial court refused to make any finding of fraud. Held: The oral
promise may be shown. Champlin v. Transport Motor Co., 77 Wash. Dec.
531, 33 Pac. (2d) 82 (1934).
The court apparently bases its conclusion on four different reasons
which may be termed as follows: Pennsylvania rule, constructive fraud,
business compulsion, and the rule on collateral agreements.
Briefly, the Pennsylvania rule is to the effect that where a person enters
a written contract on the faith of a prior or contemporaneous oral agree-
ment, it is fraudulent for the other party to attempt to enforce the
written contract without reference to the oral agreement. The obvious
effect of this is to abrogate the parol evidence rule. Wigmore on Evi-
dence (2d Ed.), sec. 2431 (c), where the doctrine in question is treated
as having been applied only in Pennsylvania,
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The second basis, constructive fraud, rests mainly on the case of Stan-
ley v. Parsons, 156 Wash. 217, 286 Pac. 654 (1930), where it was held
that an honest misrepresentation should have the same effect as a fraud-
ulent one, since the result -to the injured party was the same. This is
not dissimilar from the Pennsylvania rule noted above and is open to the
same criticism.
Business compulsion, the third basis relied upon, is apparently based
on duress, and as such, it may be a valid exception to the parol evidence
rule, However, the instant case seems to go much farther than the pre-
vious cases in this jurisdiction. Ramp Building Corp. v. Northwest
Building Co., 164 Wash. 603, 4 Pac. (2d) 507 (1931) Ferguson v. Asso-
czated Oil Co., 173 Wash. 672, 24 Pac. (2d) 82 (1933). This phase of the
instant case, while dealt with rather lightly by the majority, forms the
basis for a vigorous dissent by four judges who treat it as the sole
point in controversy
Lastly, the court refers to the oral promise as being "collateral" and
also as involving different subject matter whrich amounts to the same
thing. If this is correct, then the parol evidence rule does not apply. To
determine whether an oral promise is collateral, the proper test is the
intent of the parties, to be gathered from their language and conduct and
the surrounding circumstances. Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.), sec.
2430. Applying this to the instant case, it is clear that integration of
the two agreements would have rendered the conditional sales contract
worthless for defendant's purpose; and yet keeping this purpose clearly
in mind, it cannot be said that -the oral promise and the written contract
are necessarily inconsistent. Hence, it may be correct under Wigmore's
test, supra, to hold that the oral promise is collateral. However, the
Washington court appears to have adopted the view that the writing
itself is the sole test. Gordon v. Parke & Lacy Machinery Co., 10 Wash.
18, 38 Pac. 755 (1894) Van Doren Roofing & Cornice Co. v. Guardian
Casualty & Guaranty Co., 99 Wash. 68, 168 Pac. 1124 (1917). Since this
test excludes consideration of the surrounding circumstances, it is diffi-
cult to see how the oral promise in the instant case can be considered as
collateral. R. Y.
